Bulk Sales: Texas Law and the Uniform Commercial Code by Larson, Lennart V.
SMU Law Review
Volume 6 | Issue 4 Article 1
1952
Bulk Sales: Texas Law and the Uniform
Commercial Code
Lennart V. Larson
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review by
an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Lennart V. Larson, Bulk Sales: Texas Law and the Uniform Commercial Code, 6 Sw L.J. 417 (1952)
https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr/vol6/iss4/1
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BULK SALES: TEXAS LAW AND THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE
Lennart V. Larson*
N 1951 the Fifty-second Legislature of the State of Texas, by
concurrent resolution,' recognized the massive undertaking rep-
resented by the Uniform Commercial Code and the desirability
of studying whether or not it should be adopted as the law of the
State. Accordingly, the Legislature requested the Texas Legisla-
tive Council to make a study of the Code and to report findings and
recommendations. At the present time interested attorneys and law
teachers throughout the State are engaged in an examination and
analysis of the various Articles making up the Code.
The Uniform Commercial Code is the joint product of The
American Law Institute and the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws, both bodies having Texas attor-
neys among their members. The Code consists of ten Articles,
among them Article 6, entitled "Bulk Transfers." Eleven Sections
are found in Article 6, and the rules and procedures set out are
more detailed and complicated than are those declared in the bulk
sales laws enacted in the various states of the Union.
Some 90 decisions have been handed down dealing with the
Texas Bulk Sales Act. These decisions make possible a meaningful
comparison between Texas law as it is now and what it would be
under the Bulk Transfers Article of the Uniform Commercial
Code.
*B.S., J.D., S.J.D.; Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University; member of
the Texas State Bar.
This article was prepared in connection with a study made for the Texas Legisla-
tive Council. Acknowledgment is made of the valuable assistance of Mr. Harry T.
Holland, 1952 graduate of the Southern Methodist University Law School and member
of the Texas State Bar.
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THE TEXAS BULK SALES LAW
Bulk sales laws are of relatively recent origin. The first was
enacted in 1896, and by 1910 all states had passed such laws.
The principal promoters of the legislation were the National Asso-
ciation of Credit Men and associated bodies throughout the land.
All too frequently it would happen that a merchant or retailer of
goods would sell out his stock at a reduced price and take off with
the proceeds to parts unknown. Sometimes a merchant would build
up his stock of goods by purchases on credit with a fraudulent
view to making a quick sale and absconding. In other instances the
onset of economic depression might cause a merchant to sell out
under circumstances which would cause some creditors to be paid
in full and others not at all. The bulk sales acts were intended to
place an obstacle in the way of sales of large lots of goods not in
the ordinary course of business. The obstacle could be surmounted
if certain conditions, safeguarding creditors, were met. Jobbers,
wholesalers and manufacturers were deeply interested in preserv-
ing the merchant's stock of goods as a fund to which creditors
might have recourse.
The Texas Bulk Sales Act was passed in 1909 and was amended
in 1915.' In its present form the first section reads as follows:
The sale or transfer in bulk of any part or the whole of a stock of
merchandise, or merchandise and fixtures pertaining to the conducting
of said business otherwise than in the ordinary course of trade, and in
the regular prosecution of the business of the seller or transferor, shall
be void as against the creditors of the seller or transferor, unless the
purchaser or transferee demand and receive from the transferor a writ-
ten list of names and addresses of the creditors of the seller or trans-
feror with the amount of the indebtedness due or owing to each and
certified by the seller or transferor under oath to be a full, accurate and
2 The economic background and operation of the bulk sales acts is extensively dis-
cussed in Billig, Bulk Sales Laws: A Study in Economic Adjustment, 77 U. Pa. L. Rev.
72 (1928); Billig and Smith, Bulk Sales Laws: A Study in Statutory Interpretation,
38 W. Va. L. Q. 309 (1932); Billig and Smith, Bulk Sales Laws: Transactions
Covered by These Statutes, 39 W. Va. L. Q. 323 (1933). See also VOLD, SALES (1931)
404-416; 3 WILLISTON, SALES (Rev. ed 1948) §§ 643-643d.
3 Acts 1909, c. 27, amended, Acts 1915, c. 114, TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. (Vernon, 1948)
arts. 4001-4003.
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complete list of his creditors, and of his indebtedness; and unless the
purchaser or transferee shall at least ten days before taking possession
of such merchandise or merchandise and fixtures, or paying therefor,
notify personally or by registered mail each creditor whose name and
address is stated in said list, or of which he has knowledge, of the pro-
posed sale and of the price, terms and conditions thereof. Any pur-
chaser or transferee who shall not conform to the provisions of this
law shall, upon application of any of the creditors of the seller or trans-
feror become a receiver, and be held accountable to such creditors for
all goods, wares, merchandise and fixtures that have come into his pos-
session by virtue of such sale or transfer.
The second section declares that any transferee who conforms to
the Act will not be held accountable to any creditor of the trans-
feror for any of the goods or fixtures transferred. The third section
makes the Act inapplicable to sales by executors, administrators,
receivers or any public officer conducting a sale in his official
capacity or to a transfer of merchandise and fixtures for the pay-
ment of bona fide debts where all creditors share in proportion to
their claims and without preference.
The various state bulk sales laws have been classified into four
types.' Around three-fourths of the states have followed the New
York form of statute, and Texas is among this number. Omitted
from the Texas law is a provision, commonly found elsewhere,
requiring the seller and buyer to prepare an inventory of all goods
and fixtures sold, showing original cost and the selling price of each
item, and requiring the buyer to include in his notice to creditors the
aggregate value of the property as disclosed by the inventory.
Constitutional objections were raised soon after the bulk sales
laws were passed on the grounds that the legislation took property
without due process and violated the right to equal protection of
the laws. It was argued that a man's right to dispose of his prop-
erty and to contract with respect to it was unduly curtailed and that
a special class of property owner was singled out for regulation
in a discriminatory way. These arguments prevailed in several
jurisdictions but were rejected elsewhere. In Texas the Bulk Sales
'See Weintraijb and Levin, Balk Sales Law and Adequate Protection of Creditors,
65 Harv. L. Rev. 418 (1952) ; 3 WILLISTON, SALES (Rev. ed. 1948) § 643.
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Act was held constitutional as a reasonable exercise of police
power operating in an area and on a class which had shown a
need for regulation in order that fraud be prevented.' There is
every reason to believe that the Bulk Transfers Article of the Uni-
form Commercial Code would meet all constitutional tests if en-
acted in Texas.
APPLICATION OF THE TEXAS ACT
The Texas Bulk Sales Law treats of sales and transfers in bulk
of "a stock of merchandise, or merchandise and fixtures pertain-
ing to the conducting of... [a] business." This language was held
to preclude the contention that the statute applied only to persons
who bought commodities and sold them in small quantities for
profit.6 In other words, wholesalers, as well as retailers, are sub-
ject to the Law.
Goods which are not merchandise or fixtures are not within the
legislation, and it is up to the complaining creditor to allege and
prove that a transfer or sale of goods within the statutory terms has
occurred.7 Accounts receivable, prepaid insurance and unexpired
automobile licenses are clearly not within the terms of the Bulk
Sales Law.' The same conclusion has been reached with respect
to personal clothing, office furniture, a typewriter and trucks used
in connection with an undertaker's business.9 Whether or not an
5 Owosso Carriage & Sleigh Co. v. McIntosh & Warren, 107 Tex. 307, 179 S. W.
257 (1915), rev'g 146 S. W. 239 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912) ; Nash Hardware Co. v. Morris,
105 Tex. 217, 146 S. W. 874 (1912).
0 Butler Bros. v. Sinkin, 129 Tex. 331, 104 S.W. 2d 14 (1937); Nash Hardware
Co. v. Morris, 105 Tex. 217, 146 S. W. 874 (1912). Cf. Axtell Co. v. Word, 29 S. W.
2d 421 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930) ("stock of goods" means "goods, wares or chattels
which a merchant holds for sale at retail for a profit, and which are constantly going
out of the store in more or less small quantities, and being replaced by other goods
without any appreciable change of character by the labor or mechanical skill of
purchaser").
7 Yeager v. Dallas Coffin Co., 46 S.W. 2d 1016 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932), later pro.
ceedings, 69 S. W. 2d 493 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) er. dism.
8 Fischer v. Rio Tire Co., 65 S. W. 2d 751 (Tex. Comm. App. 1933).
9 Yeager v. Dallas Coffin Co., cited supra note 7.
A conveyance of lands is obviously not within the terms of the Bulk Sales Act, even
where liens have been paid off with the proceeds of a stock of merchandise which was
conveyed at the same time in violation of the Act. Hall v. Conine, 230 S. W. 823
(Tex. Civ. App. 1921).
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article is "merchandise" within the statute depends upon whether
or not the sale of it and other items of personal property is a prin-
cipal part of the seller's business. No Texas case has had to give
precise meaning to the word "fixtures." Presumably it refers to
trade fixtures and other articles which are annexed in such a Way
as to become a part of the realty occupied by the seller.
As originally passed, the Texas Bulk Sales Act did not mention
the sale or transfer of fixtures. It merely referred to sales or trans-
fers "of any portion of a stock of merchandise." The amendment
of 1915 added the expression, "or merchandise and fixtures per-
taining to... [a] business." Several decisions have established
that a sale or transfer of fixtures alone does not fall within the
operation of the Act.' ° The sale or transfer must be of merchan-
dise as well as of fixtures for the Act to apply. The Texas Supreme
Court has explained:
The terms of the provisions do not reasonably apply to fixtures
except in conjunction with merchandise, for otherwise the provision
excluding sales and transfers made in the ordinary course of trade and
in the regular prosecution of the business of the seller would involve
a contradiction of terms; for the business of the seller could not be the
selling of fixtures where he is not engaged in such business, and he
could not make a sale of fixtures in the regular prosecution of such
business. It is only in cases involving a sale of merchandise, by one
engaged in that business, that the provision respecting fixtures can
have any application at all.11
It seems desirable that no statutory obstacle be placed in the way
of a seller who wants to replace his old fixtures with new.
The central criterion of whether a seller is subject to the Texas
Act is whether or not a principal part of his business is the selling
of goods. If his business is primarily one of performing a service
and the sale of goods is only incidental, the Act has no application.
The business of an undertaker has been held subject to the statute,
10 In re Gary, 281 Fed. 218, 220 (S.D. Tex. 1922) ; In re Martin, 283 Fed. 833, 836
(E.D. Tex. 1921) ; M System Stores, Inc. v. Johnston, 124 Tex. 238, 76 S. W. 2d 503(1934), rev'g 48 S. W. 2d 800 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) ; Hobart Mfg. Co. v. Joyce &
Mitchell, 4 S.W. 2d 185, 188 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928). A contrary assumption has been
made without discussion of the point in In re Griffen Drug Co., 289 Fed. 140 (N.D. Tex.
1923), and Brecht Co. v. Robinowitz, 275 S. W. 213 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925) er. ref.
11 M System Stores, Inc. v. Johnston, 124 Tex. at 243, 76 S. W. 2d at 505.
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since the sale of caskets and accessories was a principal object
along with the performance of service.12 On the other hand, a
plumbing contractor was held not within the Act because the stock
of goods on hand was "merely incidental" and the "chief busi-
ness" was the "exercise of labor and mechanical skill."18
In Hobart Mfg. Company v. Joyce & Mitchell'4 a sale of a
bakery, including equipment, fixtures and ingredients for baking
bread, was held not to come within the purview of the Bulk Sales
Law. The reason was that "materials and ingredients used by a
baker in the manufacture of his wares do not constitute 'merchan-
dise' as used in the Bulk Sales Law."' 5 In the course of its opinion
the court indicated that the same result would be reached with
respect to a sale of leather by a dealer in saddles and harnesses
or, less to the point, a sale of hay or corn on hand by a livery
stablekeeper or agistor. A similar conclusion was reached in
Daggett v. Wolff'6 in which a cafe business was sold. Another
ground which might have been advanced for the judgment was
that a restaurant, in legal theory, performs services ("uttering
food") rather than sells wares. 7
The broader principle to be derived from the Hobart Mfg. Com-
pany and Daggett decisions is that a sale by a manufacturer of the
raw materials on which he works is not a sale of merchandise
within the Bulk Sales Act. Several cases may be cited for this prop-
osition.' Some of these cases go further and state that the manu-
12 Yeager v. Dallas Coffin Co., cited supra note 7. A clearer case for the application
of the Act is that of a monument dealer. Teich v. McAuley, 212 S. W. 979 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1919) er. dism.
is Axtell Co. v. Word, 29 S. W. 2d 421 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930).
14 4 S. W. 2d 185 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928).
15 Id. at 188.
16 44 S. W. 2d 1063 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931).
17 VOLt,, SALES (1931) 477; 1 WILLISTON, SALPS (Rev. ed. 1948) § 242b.
18 American Surety Co. of New York v. M-B Ise Kream Co., 65 S. W. 2d 287
(Tex. Comm. App. 1933), aj'g 38 S. W. 2d 118 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931) (ice cream
factory); Tomforde v. Mitchell Construction Co., 91 S. W. 2d 1137 (Tex. Civ. App.
1936) (brick and tile manufacturer) ; Grimes v. Huntsville State Bank, 12 S.W. 2d
1087 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928) er. ref. (lumber mill) ; see Sinkin v. Butler Bros., 77
S. W. 2d 298, 299 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934), rev'd, 129 Tex. 331, 104 S. W. 2d 14 (1937) ;
Industrial Acceptance Corporation v. Corey, 19 S. W. 2d 365, 367 (Tex. Civ. App.
1929), afl'd, 29 S. W. 2d 978 (Tex. Comm. App. 1930).
[Vol.
BULK SALES
factured product may be sold or transferred without compliance
with the Act." It is believed that these expressions are unwise.
Nothing in the Texas Act warrants the interpretation that mer-
chandise exposed for sale is not "merchandise" within the statute if
the seller has had a hand in manufacturing it. Selling the manufac-
tured product is certainly a principal part of the manufacturer's
business. The evils sought to be suppressed by the legislation would
seem to be of equal degree whether the seller manufactured his
merchandise from raw materials purchased from others or bought
the merchandise directly from others.
Ordinarily, the "merchandise" of which the Bulk Sales Act
speaks is goods exposed to sale.2" Contention has been made that
if a business closes up for a substantial period, voluntarily or
involuntarily, the goods are no longer exposed to sale and the Act
has no application. The Texas courts have rejected this argument
in at least two cases.2 ' To allow the argument to prevail would
subvert the purposes of the statute. The creditors of the business
should be able to assert their rights under the Act until their
claims are barred by the statute of limitations, and the courts
should not have to decide whether a business has been closed down
for such a period that the goods can be said no longer to be "mer-
chandise... pertaining to the conducting of said business." Per-
haps after a lapse in time laches or estoppel may prevent a credi-
tor from asserting that a sale or transfer was void.
In Krower v. Martin2 the debtor was a jewelry merchant who
19 Tomforde v. Mitchell Const. Co., 91 S.W. 2d 1137, 1138 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936)
("...that law has no application to the sale, directly by the manufacturer, of the
products made by such manufacturer") ; Sinkin v. Butler Bros., 77 S. W. 2d 298, 299
(Tex. Civ. App. 1934) (for Act to apply the goods "must be in... [their] original
character, unchanged by the labor.or mechanical skill of the dealer").
2 0 Krower v. Martin, 184 S. W. 511 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916) ; Yeager v. Dallas Coffin
Co., 46 S. W. 2d 1016, 1017 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932), later proceedings, 69 S. W. 2d
493 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) er. dism.; see Hall v. Conine, 230 S.W. 823, 825 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1921).
21 Butler Bros. v. Sinkin, 129 Tex. 331, 104 S. W. 2d 14 (1937), rev'g 77 S. W. 2d
298 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) (stock of goods reconditioned and sold four months after
fire closed store down) ; Teich v. McAuley, 212 S. W. 979 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919) er.
dism. (monument business voluntarily closed down for four months).
22 184 S. W. 511 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916).
19521
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
sold out his business in March, 1915. Excepted from the sale was
a stock of jewelry which had previously been mortgaged and
placed in the possession of the mortgagee. Six months later the
debtor entered into an agreement by which defendant bought the
jewelry and paid off the mortgage and both parties were to share
in the proceeds of resale after defendant was reimbused for his
payment. Plaintiff sued the debtor on a note executed in 1914 and
applied for garnishment against defendant, since the latter had not
complied with the Bulk Sales Law. The court held that the Law
had no application "because it has reference to sales made out of
a stock of merchandise exposed to sale. These goods were placed
to secure debts ... and ... they ceased to be a part of the stock of
merchandise, because they were segregated." 2 If one accepts the
assumption that the mortgage was valid under the statute, the judg-
ment seems correct. If goods never become a stock of merchandise
exposed to sale, or if they are effectively withdrawn from "the
conducting of said business," they cannot be said to be relied upon
by creditors and are not within the terms or spirit of the Law.
A bulk transfer falls within the statute whether the transferee
is a third party purchasing for value or is a creditor of the trans-
feror. Occasionally a transferee has attempted to avoid the statute
by asserting that the transferor agreed to apply what money he
received to his debts and that the third section of the Texas Act
authorized such an arrangement. But the holdings have been that
the section requires that transferor and transferee agree that the
latter shall distribute the stock of merchandise transferred, or its
proceeds, among the creditors proportionately.24 It is not sufficient
that the transferee pay the transferor on his agreement that he'
will pay his creditors in proportion to their claims.
Is a mortgage a "sale or transfer in bulk of any part or the
whole of a stock of merchandise?" Several federal decisions
23 Id. at 513.
24 Butler Bros. v. Sinkin, 129 Tex. 331, 334. 104 S. W. 2d 14, 15 (1937), rev'g 77
S. W. 2d 298 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) ; Kell Milling Co. v. H. 0. Wooten Grocery Co.,
195 S. W. 342 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917).
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have answered in the negative where a trustee in bankruptcy has
raised the question in behalf of unsecured creditors of the mort-
gagor.25 This position is based on a close analysis of the statute.
If the Texas Legislature had intended to include mortgages within
the scope of the Act, the word "mortgage" could easily have been
inserted. Surely mortgage transactions had come to mind and were
discussed when the statute was passed. Earlier legislation had
declared fraudulent and void mortgages on merchandise daily
exposed to sale, and, thus, creditors were already protected from
such transactions. 6 It is improbable that the Bulk Sales Law was
intended to cover the same ground. The word "transfer" is a broad
term, but in the context of the Texas Bulk Sales Law it has a nar-
row meaning. The first section requires a purchaser or transferee,
"before taking possession of such merchandise or merchandise and
fixtures, or paying therefor," to take certain steps to advise credi-
tors "of the proposed sale and of the price, terms and conditions
thereof." A mortgagee does not usually take possession of the
goods when he first receives the mortgage, and it is inaccurate to
say that he "pays" a "price" for them. The language of the Act
seems to contemplate transactions in which full title and possession
will pass, and not just a security interest, if the prescribed proce-
dures are followed.
Texas cases are to the contrary. 7 The use of the term "transfer"
is relied on, as well as the broad policy of the Act. It is argued
that if conditions are imposed on the passing of title and posses-
sion, they are also imposed on the passing of a lien which may
result, through foreclosure, in transfer of title and possession.
Assertion is made that one of the purposes of the Act is to prevent
25 In re Griffen Drug Store Co., 289 Fed. 140 (N. D. Tex. 1923) ; In re Gary, 281
Fed. 218 (S. D. Tex. 1922) ; In re Martin, 283 Fed. 833, 836 (E. D. Tex. 1921).
26 Tex. Acts 1879, c. 53, § 17, amended, Tex. Acts 1935, c. 115; TEX. REV. CiV. STAT.
(Vernon, 1948) art, 4000.
27 Beene v. National Liquor Co., 198 S.W. 596, 597, 598 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917), is
the leading case. Accord, Texas Bank & Trust Co. v. Teich, 283 S. W. 552, 554 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1926) (in effect, a tripartite trust receipt transaction) ; see Trice v. American
Trust & Savings Bank, 259 S.W. 993, 995 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924) er. ref. But in Krower
v. Martin, 184 S. W. 511, 513 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916), the assumption seems to be that
a mortgage coupled with possession by the mortgagee does not offend the Act.
1952]
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preference among creditors. The position of the Texas courts
has good policy behind it, but it is submitted that the federal courts
have the better of the argument in ascertaining the legislative
intent.
Where goods are sent to a merchant subject to a reservation of
title or security interest, the decisions indicate that repossession of
the goods pursuant to the reservation is not a bulk transfer within
the Texas Act. For instance, if the merchant is a mere agent to sell
certain goods, his principal may repossess the goods without regard
to the bulk sales legislation.2" Both conditional sellers and pur-
chase money mortgagees have been allowed to repossess goods from
merchants who were in the business of selling those very goods.2"
Related to these situations is the case in which a merchant obtains
goods from a wholesaler by fraudulent representations. Reposses-
sion of the goods by the wholesaler pursuant to his right to rescind
is not a bulk transfer within the Texas statute.80 It is safe to say
that the legislation was not intended to bar or modify the right to
rescind a sale induced by fraudulent conduct on the part of the
merchant.
A miscellany of cases bearing on the application of the Act
should be mentioned. A transfer of merchandise in satisfaction of
a claim for rent was held not a violation of the law where its value
was considerably less than the amount of rental for which the land-
28 Grimes v. Huntsville State Bank, 12 S. W. 2d 1087, 1092 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928)
er. ref.
29 Tyler State Bank & Trust Co. v. Bullington, 179 F. 2d 755 (5th Cir. 1950)
("conditional sale," tripartite trust receipt transaction) ; Southwestern Drug Corp. v.
Webster, 246 S. W. 2d 241 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) (mortgage) ; International Harvester
Co. v. Smith, 91 S. W. 2d 827 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936) er. dism. (conditional sale);
Mayfield Co. v. Harlan & Harlan, 184 S. W. 313 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916) (mortgage).
Contra: Texas Bank & Trust Co. v. Teich, 283 S. W. 552 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926) er. ref.
(purchase money mortgage or tripartite trust receipt transaction; TEx. REv. CiV. STAT.
(Vernon, 1948) art. 4000, dealing with mortgages on goods exposed to sale, also held
violated).
20 John T. Barbee & Co. v. American Brewing Assn., 207 S. W. 334, 335 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1918) ("Such statutes would not have prevented appellant from procuring a judg.
ment for its goods under the facts proven, and it necessarily follows that they would
not render appellant liable by reason of the fact that the return of the goods was
procured without the aid of a court, pursuant to a rescission of the contract.")
[Vol, 6
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lord could assert a lien. 1 It seems clear that the Law did not
amend the statute providing for the landlord's lien. A purchase
of one-half interest as partner in a grocery business has been held
within the terms of the Texas Bulk Sales Act. 2 But a dissolution
of a partnership in which a partner took over one of two stores
has been held not within the Act.3" The court said that the rights
of the creditors "were not at all affected by the transaction" and
that all the partners and partnership assets "continued bound for
the debts of the old partnership." 4
Uniform Commercial Code. Section 6-102 of the Code35 defines
a "bulk transfer" as
any transfer in bulk and not in the ordinary course of the transferor's
business of a major part of the materials, supplies, merchandise or
other inventory of an enterprise subject to... [the] Article, or of so
much thereof that what remains, together with the transferor's other
assets exclusive of the consideration received for the transfer, is inade-
quate to enable the transferor to meet his debts as they mature.
Another provision of the same Section declares that enterprises
subject to the Article "are all those whose principal business is
the sale of merchandise from stock, including those who manu-
facture what they sell."
The Bulk Transfers Article is of broader scope than the Texas.
Act. The word "fixtures" does not appear, but the expression
"materials, supplies, merchandise or other inventory" certainly
covers just about everything used in a business. Accounts receiv-
able are not within the Section. Manufacturers are expressly made
subject to the Article. However, a Comment to the Section says that
enterprises in which the principal business is the sale of services
31 C. G. Settegast v. Second National Bank, 126 Tex. 330, 87 S. W. 2d 1070 (1935),
rev'g 52 S. W. 2d 533 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932).
32 S. H. Twaddell v. H. 0. Wooten Grocer Co., 130 Tex. 42, 106 S. W. 2d 266
(1937), reforming 68 S. W. 2d 285 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934).
33 Quicksilver v. Haynes, 56 F. 2d 59 (5th Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 287 U. S. 602
(1932).
34Id. at 61.




(e.g., barber shops, hotels, restaurants, trades and professions)
are not covered.
A transfer of a substantial part of the equipment of a business
"is a bulk transfer if it is made in connection with a bulk transfer
of inventory, but not otherwise." 6 This provision is in harmony
with Texas holdings that a sale of fixtures alone does not come
within the terms of the Bulk Sales Act. It seems desirable that busi-
ness men should be able to sell and replace either fixtures or equip-
ment without having to comply with a bulk transfer statute.
"Transfer," under the Bulk Transfers Article, "includes the
voluntary creation of a security interest.""7 Thus, enactment of the
Article would confirm the view taken by the Texas courts and
reject that of the federal courts. It does not appear that the lan-
guage of the Article would compel a change in the holdings that
repossession of goods by a conditional seller or purchase money
mortgagee is not within the scope of bulk transfer legislation.
Section 6-103 enumerates transfers not subject to the Article.
Among them are general assignments "for the benefit of all credi-
tors of the transferor, and subsequent transfers by the assignee;"
sales in foreclosure of security interests; sales by executors, admin-
istrators, receivers, trustees in bankruptcy, or public officers under
judicial process; and sales made in the course of dissolution of
a corporation where creditors receive advance notice equivalent to
that required under the Article. These exceptions from the Article
are substantially the same as those set forth in the Texas Act. A
new exception, which is obvious enough, is "[t] ransfers of prop-
erty which is exempt from execution."
Three other exceptions in Section 6-103 should be mentioned.
36 § 6-102(3).
37 § 6-102(2). Section 6-105(1) states that a bulk transfer to secure an existing
-debt is ineffective unless the requirements of the Article are satisfied.
38 § 6-103(3) seems to contemplate that valid liens and security interests may
,exist in goods subject to the Bulk Transfers Article.
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Transfers for the sole purpose of securing repayment of new value
extended to the transferor are excluded from the operation of the
Article. Such transfers are covered by Article 9 (Secured Transac-
tions) of the Code. Also excepted are transfers to a person main-
taining a known place of business who becomes bound to pay the
debts of the transferor in full, gives public notice of that fact, and
who is solvent. Still another exception is a transfer to a new busi-
ness enterprise organized to take over the transferor's business, if
public notice of the transaction is given, the new enterprise assumes
the debts, and the transferor receives nothing but an interest in the
new enterprise junior to the claims of creditors. The latter two
exceptions are transactions in which there is no impairment of
the creditors' position.
COMPLIANCE WITH TEXAS ACT
A bulk sale or transfer in Texas is valid and effective (1) if the
purchaser or transferee demands and receives "a written list of
names and addresses of the creditors of the seller or transferor
with the amount of the indebtedness due or owing to each and
certified by the seller or transferor under oath to be a full, accurate
and complete list of his creditors, and of his indebtedness;" and
(2) if the purchaser or transferee "at least ten days before taking
possession of... [the] merchandise and fixtures, or paying there-
for" notifies "personally or by registered mail" each creditor on
the list, or of whom he has knowledge, "of the proposed sale and
of the price, terms and conditions thereof." It has been held that
the burden of proof on the issue of compliance with the Bulk Sales
Law is on the purchaser or transferee. 9
The Act of 1909 required that the notice to creditors be given
ten days "before the sale or transfer". The amendment of 1915
is clear that the notice may be given ten days before the purchaser
or transferee takes possession or ten days before paying for the
-9 Gerlach Mercantile Co. v. Hughes-Bozarth-Anderson Co., 189 S. W. 784, 791
(Tex. Civ. App. 1916) er. ref.
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goods and fixtures. This interpretation has been adopted by the
courts.40
If a purchaser or transferee complies with the Act, he obtains
good title to the merchandise and fixtures even though creditors
have been omitted, inadvertently or otherwise, from the list pre-
pared and certified by the seller or transferor.4' The list may
enumerate creditors, or it may be an affidavit that the seller or
transferor owes no indebtedness. The purchaser or transferee is
under no duty to see to it that the list of creditors is correct and
complete. If he complies with the Act in good faith, he has the
assurance that his title and possession are valid.
If, however, the transferee "has knowledge" of creditors who
are not listed, the terms of the Act require that he give them notice.
Fischer v. Rio Tire Co.4" extends this duty in an important way.
The court held that a buyer of goods in bulk "must take notice of
taxes due, whether listed or not." Under this rule an independent
40 San Antonio Machine & Supply Co. v. McCarthy, 71 S. W. 2d 611 (Tex. Civ. App.
1934) er. dism.; Brecht Co. v. Robinowitz, 275 S. W. 213, 214 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925)
er. ref., approved in Recent Cases, 4 Tex. L. Rev. 260 (1926). In the latter decision
the court said:
It further seems clear to us that when, in 1915 (Laws 1915, c. 114) the
Legislature came to amend this statute and for the first time inserted in it the
disjunctive provision, "and unless the purchaser or transferee shall at least 10
days before taking possession of such merchandise or merchandise and fixtures,
or paying therefor, notify," etc., it meant to say that the required notice before
paying for the property would be sufficient, irrespective of when the possession
might be taken, and vice versa.
41 Fischer v. Rio Tire Co., 65 S. W. 2d 751, 756 (Tex. Comm. App. 1933), rev'g
48 S. W. 2d 367 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) (affidavit that seller had no creditors and owed
no debts) ; Weidlick Pen Mfg. Co. v. Palace Drug Co., 283 S. W. 574 (Tex. Civ. App.
1926) ; Brecht Co. v. Robinowitz, 275 S. W. 213 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925) er. ref. In the
Fischer case the Commission of Appeals stated:
We think a fair and reasonable construction of the statute to be that a
purchaser, who in good faith demands and receives an affidavit showing a list
of his creditors, or that he has none, should not be held liable to creditors,
unless known to him, when the transferor has either by fraud or inadvertence
omitted the name of a creditor or stated that he has none. Of course, if the
purchaser knew of any claim not listed, that rule would not apply as to the
claim not listed known to the purchaser, or if- it appears that the purchaser
obtains knowledge or information of such facts, which are sufficient to put a
prudent man upon inquiry, and which are of such a nature that the inquiry,
if pursued with reasonable diligence, would lead to a discovery of the claim.
4,2 65 S. W. 2d 751, 757 (Tex. Comm. App. 1933), rev'g 48 S. W. 2d 367, 370
(Tex. Civ. App. 1932).
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school district and the City of Wichita Falls were permitted to
assert rights under the Bulk Sales Act even though the buyer had
no actual notice of tax claims and the sworn statement of his seller
did not list them.
In Weidlick Pen Mfg. Co. v. Palace Drug Co.4" a purchaser of
the entire stock of goods of a retail drug business received from
his seller a certified list of creditors. No notice was sent to the
creditors, but the purchaser took possession of the goods and de-
posited $5,000 in a bank, which was used to pay all creditors
listed as well as some who were not listed. Thereafter plaintiff,
a creditor who was not on the list, sought to hold the purchaser on
the ground of non-compliance with the Bulk Sales Act. In denying
relief the court said that the Act did not "require the doing of
something unnecessary." Notice did not have to be sent to the listed
creditors where arrangement was made to pay them off in full and
such payment was made. The purchaser had a right to rely upon
the correctness of the seller's list. A question can be raised about
the decision. If the statutory notice had been given and delay had
occurred in passing of possession or payment for the goods, it is
possible that the news of the sale might have reached plaintiff's
ears.
A more dubious case is San Antonio Machine & Supply Co. v.
McCarthy." There a purchaser of a portion of a stock of goods of
a mercantile business did not demand or receive a certified list of
creditors. He did, however, give sufficient personal notice to plain-
tiff creditor that he was in the process of buying the goods. A week
after he took possession, the purchaser advised plaintiff of the sale.
Subsequently, plaintiff sought to reach the goods, alleging violation
of the Bulk Sales Law. Relief was denied because plaintiff creditor
could not "complain of the failure of McCarthy [purchaser] to
secure such verified list when McCarthy knew of this debt inde-
pendent of any list of verified creditors." This reasoning is specious
43 283 S. W. 574 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926).
44 71 S. W. 2d 611, 612 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) er. dism.
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because a main safeguard of the statute is getting the seller's sworn
statement concerning his debts and creditors. A seller's sworn certi-
fication is more likely to be accurate and complete than his unsworn
oral statement, and the affidavit is the primary source of names
and addresses of creditors who should be notified. Possibly the
case can be justified if plaintiff was seller's only creditor, a very
doubtful assumption. It is submitted that the court should have
held that the Act was violated. Creditors other than the plaintiff
may never have received notice because of the purchaser's failure
to insist on a certified list. The facts of the case do not indicate any
ground for estopping plaintiff from asserting rights against the
goods in behalf of himself and other creditors.
Uniform Commercial Code. The Code is similar to the Texas
Bulk Sales Act in requiring certain steps to be taken by a transferee
as a condition to his gaining good title. Section 6-104 states that
a bulk transfer is ineffective unless (a) the transferee requires the
transferor to prepare a list of his existing creditors, (b) the parties
prepare a schedule of the property transferred sufficient to identify
it, and (c) the transferee preserves the list and schedule for six
months following the transfer and permits inspection or copying
of either at reasonable hours by any creditor of the transferor. An
alternative to (c) is afforded in filing the list and schedule in some
public office. The list of creditors must be signed and sworn to by
the transferor, and their names and business addresses must be
set out along with the amounts of the debts if known. Persons who
assert claims which are disputed must be listed. "Responsibility
for the completeness and accuracy of the list of creditors rests on
the transferor, and the transfer is not rendered ineffective by errors
or omissions therein unless the transferee is shown to have had
knowledge."45 This statement is in accord with Texas cases.
Under Section 6-105 a bulk sale is ineffective "unless at least ten
days before the goods are moved or the transferee takes possession




whichever happens first, the transferee gives notice of the transfer"
to the creditors. This provision would change Texas law, since the
Texas Act requires that the notice be given ten days before posses-
sion is taken or before payment is made for the merchandise and
fixtures. It is not entirely clear that the Texas provision is inferior
to the Code provision, but the latter does have the desirable feature
of allowing time for the creditors to act before either title or
possession passes.
The notice to creditors must be delivered personally or sent by
registered mail to all persons on the list prepared by the transferor
and to all other persons known by the transferee to assert claims.""
The' notice must contain (a) a statement that a bulk transfer is
about to be made (or, in the case of a security transfer, has been,
made), (b) the names and business addresses of the transferor and
transferee, and all business names and addresses used by the trans-
feror within the preceding three years, and'(c) a statement as to,
whether all the debts of the transferor are to be paid in full as
they come due as a result of the transaction, and, if so, the address
to which creditors should send their bills. 7 If the debts are not be
paid in full as they mature or if the transferee is in doubt on the
point, the notice must contain a further statement of (a) the loca-
tion and general description of the property to be transferred and
the estimated total of the debts, (b) the address where the schedule
of property and list of creditors may be inspected, (c) whether
the transfer is to secure or pay existing debts and, if so, the amount
of the debts and the names of the creditors, and (d) whether the
transfer is for new consideration and, if so, the amount and time
and place of payment." These specifications for the notice are
obviously more detailed than those of the Texas statute. It is to be
noted that a short form of notice is provided for if the debts of the
transferor are to be paid in full.






fers Article. The transferor must furnish a list of creditors and
assist in the preparation of a schedule of the property to be sold.
The list and schedule are received by the persons (collectively
called "auctioneer") who have the control and responsibility for
the auction. The schedule must be retained for inspection and
copying for six months after the auction, and notice must be given
to creditors ten days before the auction occurs. Failure of the auc-
tioneer to perform any of his duties does not affect the validity of
the sale, but he is made liable for the claims of the transferor's
creditors, not exceeding the net proceeds of the auction. This Sec-
tion would be new to Texas law. No Texas case has dealt with a
bulk sale by auction.
Under most of the present-day bulk sales statutes, including that
of Texas, no duty is imposed upon a transferee to see to it that the
consideration he pays will be used by the transferor to pay his
debts. Once he has obtained from the transferor a sworn list of
creditors and has given them proper notice, he is in a position to
take valid title and possession, and he is not concerned with what
the transferor does thereafter. Within the period of the notice the
creditors must investigate and decide whether they should per-
suade the transferor to liquidate his debts or should take legal
action.
Section 6-106 imposes a duty on the transferee who pays a new
consideration "to assure that such consideration is applied ... to
pay those debts... which are either shown on the list furnished by
the transferor or filed in writing in the place stated in the notice
within thirty days after the mailing of such notice." The duty may
be enforced by any creditor for the benefit of all creditors. If some
debts are in dispute, the necessary sum may be withheld until the
claims are settled or adjudicated. If the consideration is insufficient
to pay all debts in full, the distribution is made pro rata. A Com-
ment to the Section suggests ways whereby the transferor may
assure that the consideration is used to pay debts. He may hold
the consideration himself, or deposit it in an account subject to
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checks bearing his counter-signature, or he may deposit it in escrow.
Section 6-106 is "bracketed" to show a division of opinion as to
whether it is desirable legislation. A Note to the Section states that
the provision is one on which states may differ "without serious
damage to the principle of uniformity."
NON-COMPLIANCE: RIGHTS OF CREDITORS
Non-compliance with the Texas Act makes a bulk sale or trans-
fer "void as against the creditors of the seller or transferor." Of
course, failure to comply is not excused on a showing that the
purchaser or transferee was ignorant of the Act and acted inno-
cently and with the best of motives.49 Where a purchaser obtains
the seller's affidavit but knows of creditors not listed and fails to
give them notice, it has been held that such creditors only may
claim rights under the Act.5" Criticism may be offered of this rule
in that it may lead to unfair preference of creditors and in that Act
appears to make a transfer void and to allow relief to "any of the
creditors" where the statutory requirements are not fulfilled. Noti-
fied creditors have a vital interest in the preparation of a complete
list of creditors and notice to all of whom the purchaser knows.
The "creditors" protected are persons who have that status at
the time of the transfer, and subsequent creditors cannot claim
the benefits of the Act.5 In McWade Tutbe Co. v. Newnam52 plain-
tiff sued for a commission due for arranging a sale of inner tubes.
49 H. 0. Wooten Grocery Co. v. Coleman, 32 S. W. 2d 279 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930) ;
Dallas Coffin Co. v. Yeager, 19 S. W. 2d 156 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929) er. dism., later
proceedings, 46 S. W. 2d 1016 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932), 69 S. W. 2d 493 (Tex. Civ. App.
1934) er. dism.; C. J. Gerlach & Bro., Inc. v. Texas Bldg. Material Co., 245 S. W. 716,
718 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922) ; Williams v. J. W. Crowdus Drug Co., 167 S. W. 187, 188
(Tex. Civ. App. 1914).
50 Fischer v. Rio Tire Co., 65 S. W. 2d 751, 757, 758 (Tex. Comm. App. 1933), rev'g
48 S. W. 2d 367 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932).
-51 Trice v. American Trust & Savings Bank, 259 S. W. 993 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924)
er. ref.
A trustee in bankruptcy succeeds to whatever rights the creditors have under the Bulk
Sales Law. Gross v. Grossman, 2 F. 2d 458 (5th Cir. 1924) ; Trice v. American Trust &
Savings Bank, supra.
52 258 S. W. 560, 561 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924) er. dism.
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He claimed the status of a creditor and sought relief against de-
fendant purchaser of the debtor's entire stock of goods. Plaintiff
was successful in his action on a finding that through his efforts
"the sale had been fully made and executed at the time the bulk
sale was made" and "while... [plaintiff's] claim was not actually
due, it had fully accrued." The language and policy of the Act
clearly warrant an interpretation of the word "creditor" to cover
a person who may eventually have a claim under an existing
contract.
It has been stated that a creditor is protected by the statute
whether the debt owed was incurred in the course of seller's business
or in some other connection."3 But in M System Stores, Inc. v.
Johnston5' a creditor was denied the right to reach the subject mat-
ter of a bulk sale by a partnership of which his debtor was a mem-
ber. The court said:
The creditors with whom the statute deals are, in the terms of the
statute, those of the "seller." While it is true that a partnership is not
a legal entity, like a corporation, nevertheless the assets and liabilities
of the partnership are commonly treated as possessing distinct charac-
teristics."
It was recognized that creditors of the partnership have a special
claim to have partnership assets applied to debts owed them and
not debts owed to creditors of individual partners.
A sale or transfer in violation of the Bulk Sales Law is "void"
as against creditors and no other class of persons.56 It is probably
more accurate to say that such sale or transfer is voidable, rather
-5 Fischer v. Rio Tire Co., 65 S. W. 2d 751, 756 (Tex. Comm. App. 1933), rev'g
48 S. W. 2d 367 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) ; Gardner v. Goodner Wholesale Grocery Co.,
247 S. W. 291, 292 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922), certified questions answered, 113 Tex. 423,
256 S. W. 911 (1923).
-4 124 Tex. 238, 76 S. W. 2d 503 (1934), rev'g 48 S. W. 2d 800 (Tex. Civ. App.
1932).
55 Id. at 242, 76 S. W. 2d at 504.
66 Smith-Calhoun Rubber Co. v. McGhee Rubber Co., 235 S. W. 321, 323 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1921); Hall v. Conine, 230 S. W. 823, 825 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921).
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than void, if a creditor chooses to take action.57 In a number of
cases a buyer of goods in bulk has defended a suit for breach of
contract on the ground that the seller would not or did not furnish
him with a sworn list of creditors. Texas decisions seem to have
established that if the contract between the seller and buyer makes
no reference to the Bulk Sales Law, then the buyer cannot insist on
the seller's compliance with its terms.5" The reason is that the Law
is purely for the protection of creditors.
A contrary result was reached in the recent case of Ashton v.
Leysen"9 where plaintiff contracted to-sell her gift shop "free and
clear of encumbrances." Defendants refused to perform the con-
tract unless plaintiff complied with the Bulk Sales Act. In sus-
taining the defense the court pointed out that if defendants did
not insist on compliance with the statute, they would hold the stock
of goods as "trustees for the creditors." Since defendants would
not be receiving unencumbered ownership, they had a right not to
perform. The observation should be made that the general rule is
that a seller of goods makes implied warranties of title and free-
dom from encumbrances.6" Hence the Ashton decision is note-
worthy, since the holding has possibilities of extension. Jackson v.
Burton61 is a case in which a purchase contract was made subject
to the Bulk Sales Act and to termination if any lien or encumbrance
was placed upon the goods sold. The buyers had ample contractual
ground for avoiding the contract when creditors of the seller took
57 "The provision that 'sales shall be void as against creditors,' etc., is to be
construed to the effect that such sales shall be voidable at the instance of creditors.
Keeping in mind the purpose sought to be achieved by the statute and also that
Legislatures and others use the term 'void' and 'voidable' without regard to the strict
legal distinction between them, we think the legislative intent reflected in the statute
renders any other construction clearly erroneous." Smith-Calhoun Rubber Co. v. Mc-
Ghee Rubber Co., 235 S.W. 321, 323 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921). See also Freedman &
Mellinger v. Maier, 238 S. W. 1013, 1014 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922) er. dism.
58 Collins-Decker Co. v. John P. Crumpler, 114 Tex. 528, 272 S.W. 772 (1925);
Veselka v. Forres, 283 S. W. 303, 307 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926); Freedman & Mellinger
v. Maier, 238 S. W. 1013, 1014 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922) er. dism.; see Smith-Calhoun
Rubber Co. v. McGhee Rubber Co., 235 S. W. 321, 323 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921).
59 237 S. W. 2d 713 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) er. dism.
60VOLD, SALES (1931) 448; 1 WILLISTON, SALES (Rev. ed. 1948) § 218.
1 99 S. W. 2d 395 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936).
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advantage of the statute and garnisheed the merchandise. In effect,
said the court, the buyers were made "receivers" of the goods. In
view of the earlier decisions, a purchaser of merchandise in bulk
would do well to contract expressly for the seller's compliance
with the Act.
The Act of 1909 specified no procedure or remedy to be used
by creditors. It merely said that sales and transfers in violation of
the Act were "void" and left the consequences to be worked out
by the courts. One consequence was that the goods remained the
property of the seller, and a creditor could attach the goods or
levy execution even though they were in the possession of the pur-
chaser.62 A creditor who acted speedily could expect to be paid in
full, since he had no duty to share with others.
Argument was made in several cases that a purchaser should be
held directly and personally liable for the debts of his seller. This
argument was rejected. 8 The courts said that the Act was not in-
tended to hold a purchaser for more than the goods he received
and that he was responsible only after a lien was acquired on the
goods or proceeds by attachment, levy or garnishment. In other
words, the procedure under the Act was only ancillary to the main
action against the debtor-seller.
Use of the garnishment process was explained in Owosso Car-
riage & Sleigh Co. v. McIntosh & Warren." Plaintiff sued for a
debt and secured a writ of garnishment against the purchaser of
the debtor's stock of goods. The court declared:
62 Williams v. J. W. Crowdus Drug Co., 167 S. W. 187 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914);
Terrell Grain & Mercantile Co. v. Young, 152 S. W. 671 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912).
63 Owosso Carriage & Sleigh Co. v. McIntosh & Warren, 107 Tex. 307, 179 S. W.
257 (1915), rev'g 146 S. W. 239 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912); Barcus v. Parlin-Orendorff
Implement Co., 184 S. W. 640, 643 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916), later proceedings, 207
S. W. 586 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918) er. rel.; Eagle Drug Co. v. White, 182 S. W. 378,
385 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915); Bewley v. Sims, 145 S. W. 1076 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912)
er. dism.
84 107 Tex. 307, 179 S. W. 257 (1915), rev'g 146 S. W. 239 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912).
Accord: Gerlach Mercantile Co. v. Hughes-Bozarth-Anderson Co., 189 S. W. 784
(Tex. Civ. App. 1916) er. ref. (value found to be equal to purchase price); Barcus
v. Parlin-Orendorff Implement Co., 184 S. W. 640 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916), later proceed.
ings, 207 S. W. 586 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918) er. ref.
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Defendants in error had not the power nor the right to acquire title
to this property as against creditors, for the statute in cases of this kind
impounds and holds the merchandise for the benefit of creditors of the
seller. And since their act in attempting to purchase was void, it fol-
lows, as stated above, that the title to said property remained in Sweet,
the seller, and did not pass to the defendants in error; and, when
defendants in error sold said merchandise, the proceeds of said sale
were subject to garnishment.
When the defendants in error sold the merchandise, the title to which
remained by law in Sweet, they became indebted to Sweet for its value.
Having sold and converted property which, in law, belonged to Sweet,
it obviously follows that they owed him for its value.
65
The conclusion was that the garnishment "fastened" on the fund
received by the garnishees. It is to be noticed that the value of the
goods may be different from the amount of the proceeds. In some
cases the value might exceed the proceeds, although it is unlikely
that the value would ever be less than the proceeds.
The Act of 1915 continued to make bulk sales and transfers
"void as against the creditors of the seller or transferor" unless
the stated requirements were met and added that a non-complying
purchaser or transferee, "upon application of any of the credi-
tors," should "become a receiver and be held accountable to such
creditors for all goods, wares, merchandise and fixtures" coming
into his possession. Uncertainty arose as to the extent of change
intended by the Texas Legislature. One case held that the amend-
ment made a purchaser who had disposed of the goods liable in a
direct suit up to the value of the goods.66 The purchaser was said
to be a converter and personally liable for the entire debt if the
goods had equal or greater value. Other cases took the more reason-
able view that the new expression in the statute merely added a
new procedure. Under this view a creditor could still levy on goods
in the hands of the purchaser or could garnishee the purchaser for
65 Id. at 313, 179 S. W. at 259.
66 Hay v. Behrens Drug Co., 214 S. W. 940, 942 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919).
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their value if they had been sold or consumed.67
In Gardner v. Goodner Wholesale Grocery Co.8 the Texas Su-
preme Court undertook to clarify rights and procedures under the
bulk sales statute. On proof of violation of the statute plaintiff
creditor obtained a joint and several judgment against the debtor-
seller and the purchaser. The court of civil appeals held that the
petition was insufficient to sustain a personal judgment against the
purchaser and indicated that plaintiff had the same remedies of
attachment, levy and garnishment that existed under the original
Act. 6 In addition, plaintiff could bring an action to hold the pur-
chaser accountable as a receiver of the goods.
The supreme court said that the impression prevailed in the state
that under the 1909 Act attachment, levy or garnishment was nec-
essary. The court thought it unnecessary to say whether this impres-
sion was correct, "as we are of the opinion that it is not now re-
quired." The court continued:
As shown by the decisions in other states having a similar law, the
statute as now written was not intended to do away with proceedings
by garnishment or other process, but was intended to furnish an addi-
tional remedy, more direct, effective, and equitable to the various cred-
itors, if more than one. If it has ever been necessary to resort to sup-
plementary proceedings, we think such would not be necessary where
the transferee claims ownership of the property in his own right....
The liability of a purchaser of a stock of goods and fixtures in viola-
tion of the Bulk Sales Law is that of a receiver. Having taken the prop-
erty subject to the rights of the creditors, he becomes bound in equity
to see that the property or its value is appropriated to the satisfaction
67 C. J. Gerlach & Bro., Inc. v. Texas Bldg. Material Co., 245 S. W. 716 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1922); Rachofsky v. Rachofsky, 203 S. W. 1134 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918);
Kell Milling Co. v. H. 0. Wooten Grocery Co., 195 S. W. 342 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917);
but see Hall v. Conine, 230 S. W. 823, 825 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921) (purpose of
statute "is to protect creditors against injurious discriminations by debtors;" right
to defeat transfer, "by means of a writ of garnishment or in any other manner, is not
given to enable the attacking creditor to secure an advantage in the distribution of
assets").
8 "113 Tex. 423, 256 S. W. 911 (1923), rev'g 247 S. W. 291 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922).
69 247 S. W. at 293, 294. "A purchaser's liability was that of a holder of a fund
belonging in the eyes of the law to the seller, and we do not understand that under
the old law this liability could be asserted except through some process that would
create a lien on the property or fund."
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of claims of the creditors of his seller. He becomes the trustee of an
express trust, and is subject to the same duties and liabilities of such a
trustee. We think the law was intended to charge him with liability,
however, only to the extent of the value of the property received by
him, and this liability is to all of the creditors pro rata.
7
0
The court was of the opinion that a formal application must be
made to hold the purchaser as a receiver. In such capacity he is
under a duty to account:
If the property had been disposed of, such an accounting should nec-
essarily include information as to its value at the time it was received,
as well as the amount received by him for the property disposed of.
While primarily he would be liable for the actual value of the prop-
erty, yet there might be circumstances that would limit his liability to
the amount actually received by him for the property, if less than its
actual value.... If any property received by the purchaser by virtue
of the transfer remained in his possession, the court would be author-
ized to order its sale. 71
In the receivership proceeding creditors may be ordered to file
their claims, which are paid on a pro rata basis, if not in full.
Texas Bank & Trust Co. v. Teich71 is a well-considered case which
offers further explanation of the Gardner decision. Plaintiff creditor
sought to levy execution on an automobile which was subject of a
bulk transfer from the debtor to defendant trust company. In revers-
ing a judgment for plaintiff the court recognized that a material
change in the Bulk Sales Law had been made in 1915. Previously
an "attaching creditor was entitled to the full amount of his debt,
if the property attached was of that value," but now the pur-
chaser's liability is "pro rata to all creditors" in the amount of the
"value of the property purchased."7 3 The court went on to say:
Appellees confuse the two methods by which a creditor may, since
the amendment, bring the purchaser violating the law into court, as
fixing two separate and distinct methods of fixing liability, contend-
ing that, where a diligent creditor attaches the property, he should be
permitted to recover the full amount of his debt, if the property is of
70 113 Tex. at 425, 426, 256 S. W. at 912.
71 Id. at 427, 256 S. W. at 913.
72 283 S. W. 552 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926) er. ref.
73 Id. at 554, 555.
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that value, and that, on the other hand, if the creditor sues for an
accounting as authorized by the statute, he is entitled to recover only
pro rata with other creditors. Appellees' petition.., showed a sufficient
compliance with both methods of obtaining jurisdiction over the pur-
chaser, but the court failed to charge the purchaser with the only lia-
bility which the statutes imposed upon it, that of accounting to all the
creditors for the value of the property received pro rata. The mode and
manner of fixing the liability and of adjusting the rights of all cred-
itors is clearly and well set forth in Gardner v. Goodner, supra.74
A third case making an authoritative declaration concerning pro-
cedures under the Act is Southwestern Drug Corp. v. McKesson &
Robbins, Inc.75 Plaintiff creditor secured judgment against its
debtor and then sought to garnishee defendants who had purchased
all of the debtor's stock of merchandise. The Texas Supreme Court
declared:
The Bulk Sales Law as amended did not abolish garnishment pro-
ceedings to assist in enforcing rights arising under the statute, but
permits such proceedings as an additional remedy, if necessary, to
enforce rights arising under the statute.
The Bulk Sales Law was enacted for the benefit of all creditors, and
it was not intended that any one creditor should derive a superior right
by instituting garnishment proceedings. All creditors... should share
pro rata in the goods, wares, and merchandise transferred in trust to
the purchaser or purchasers thereof, or in their value.
Respondent should file in the trial court necessary pleadings disclos-
ing the facts of this case, showing that the purchasers or garnishees in
this case were liable as receivers of the goods received by them...
under the Bulk Sales Law. The trial court should be furnished with
pleadings and proof, if possible, showing who the creditors .. . are,
and the amounts claimed by them.
76
In summary, the following statements seem supported. The
most appropriate remedy for violation of the statute is to apply to
the proper court to have the purchaser or transferee declared a re-
ceiver. In the proceeding the transferee will be required to divulge
74 Id. at 555. Emphasis added.
75 141 Tex. 284, 172 S. W. 2d 485 (1943), rev'g 165 S. W. 2d 758 (Tex. Civ. App.
1942).
U Id. at 288, 289, 172 S. W. 2d at 487.
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the nature and value of the property received, what disposition
has been made of the property, and the proceeds thereof. All credi-
tors will be permitted to file claims and will share pro rata in what
is made available through the receivership. The property still in
the transferee's possession may be sold under order of the court.
If the transferee has disposed of all the property received (by
sale, commingling or consumption), he is personally liable for its
value. The creditors have recourse to this personal liability in pro.
portion to their claims. A number of cases in direct holdings or
by dicta recognize these principles.77
The writ of garnishment may properly be used to reach goods
or their value in the hands of the purchaser. But the writ is merely
a means whereby the goods or their value may be made available
to all creditors.7" In the period between the Gardner and Southwest-
ern Drug decisions a few civil appeals cases allowed garnishment
in favor of a single creditor for the amount of his claim.79 Perhaps
these cases may be explained in that plaintiff was the only creditor
or in that the garnishee failed to plead or prove the existence of
other creditors. Otherwise, they must be regarded as a carry-over
from the law developed under the Act of 1909. Similar comment
may be made concerning one or two cases in this period in which
direct suit or levy of execution apparently was allowed against
the purchaser.8 "
77 Fischer v. Rio Tire Co., 65 S. W. 2d 751 (Tex. Comm. App. 1933), rev'g 48 S. W.
2d 367 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) ; Phillips v. Cargill, 131 S. W. 2d 775 (Tex. Civ. App.
1939); H. 0. Wooten Grocery Co. v. Coleman, 32 S. W. 2d 279, 280 (Tex. Civ. App.
1930); Cornish v. Nance Motor Co., 13 S. W. 2d 139 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928) er. ref.;
Lacey v. Dayton Rubber Mfg. Co., 270 S. W. 916 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925) er. dism.; see
Quicksilver v. Haynes, 56 F. 2d 59, 61 (5th Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 287 U. S. 602 (1932) ;
Supervend Corporation v. Jones, 235 S. W. 2d 707, 709 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950) ; H. D.
Lee Mercantile Co. v. Thompson, 161 S.W. 2d 581, 582 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942); Hobart
Mfg. Co. v. Joyce & Mitchell, 4 S. W. 2d 185 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928).
78 Midland Shoe Co. v. A. L. & K. Dry Goods Co., 281 S. W. 344 (Tex. Civ. App.
1926) er. ref., later proceedings, 3 S. W. 2d 475 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927) er. ref.
79 White v. Monnig Dry Goods Co., 59 S. W. 2d 949 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933) er. dism.;
Dallas Coffin Co. v. Yeager, 19 S. W. 2d 156 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929) er. disin., later pro,
ceedings, 46 S. W. 2d 1016 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932), 69 S. W. 2d 493 (Tex. Civ. App.
1934) er. dism.
80 Morrison v. Sewell, 4 S. W. 2d 1029, 1031 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927) er. dism.; Mc-
wade Tube Co. v. Newnam, 258 S. W. 560 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924) er. dism.; see Renken
v. J. M. Radford Grocery Co., 137 S. W. 2d 101 (Tex Civ. App. 1940) er. dism.
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From the standpoints of effectiveness of relief and fairness to
all creditors the development of the receivership concept as the
primary remedy under the Texas statute deserves approval. Attach-
ment, levy of execution and garnishment have wisely been sub-
ordinated to the objective of allowing all creditors a share in the
goods or proceeds in the hands of a purchaser. One cannot be sure
that these writs will always be denied where a creditor seeks to use
them for his exclusive benefit. But such use should be limited to
instances where there are no other creditors who can assert rights
under the Bulk Sales Act."1
Some problems of joinder and venue peculiar to bulk sales cases
have reached the appellate courts. In a suit against a resident
debtor-seller a non-resident purchaser is not a necessary party, and
his plea of privilege has been sustained. 2 Suit to make a purchaser
a receiver of goods may in some instances be brought without
joinder of the debtor-seller, and then the proper venue is the resi-
dence of the purchaser."8 One case, decided by a divided court and
of doubtful authority, held that a purchase in violation of the Bulk
Sales Act was a trespass placing the venue in the county where
it was committed. 4
Circumstances and conduct may prevent a creditor from assert-
ing rights under the Act. Where a creditor received from the pur-
chaser more than the latter obtained, it was held that "the equities
of the transaction were more than satisfied" and the creditor had
no right to further relief.88 Creditors who learn of a bulk transfer
81 See Phillips v. Cargill, 131 S. W. 2d 775, 776 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
82 Reynolds v. Groce-Wearden Co., 250 S. W. 2d 749 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952) ; Gulf
Refining Co. v. Lipscomb, 41 S. W. 2d 248 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931).
83 Texlite, Inc. v. Pecos Mercantile Co., 128 Tex. 57, 96 S. W. 2d 73 (1936), afl'g
65 S. W. 2d 811 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933) ; Fischer v. Rio Tire Co., 65 S. W. 2d 751, 757
(Tex. Comm. App. 1933), rev'g 48 S. W. 2d 367 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) ; see H. D. Lee
Mercantile Co. v. Thompson, 161 S. W. 2d 581 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942) (suit against
resident purchaser of goods; non-resident debtor-seller held necessary party, and plea
of privilege overruled).
84 Bank of Carbon v. Coxe Mercantile Co., 241 S. W. 602 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922)
er. dism. The majority of the court relied on Hay v. Behrens Drug Co., discussed at
note 66 supra, which was based on an assumption which has been overruled.
85 S. H. Twaddell v. H. 0. Wooten Grocer Co., 130 Tex. 42, 106 S. W. 2d 266 (1937),
.reforming 68 S. W. 2d 285 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934).
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in which the buyer gives a note to be used in paying the seller's
debts and who affirm the transaction will be estopped to claim rights
under the statute."6 The suggestion has been made that a creditor
who is present at a bulk sale, bears the seller tell his buyer that he
owes no debts, and remains silent will be estopped to reach the
goods or their value. 7 A creditor who takes a bulk transfer in pay-
ment of or as security for his claim, or who is a party thereto, will
be denied any right to share pro rata in the property when other
creditors bring proceedings under the Bulk Sales Act. 8 The theory
is that the transferee is a trustee who has made claims inconsistent
with the rights of the beneficiaries (creditors), and he is estopped
to assert the rights of a beneficiary.
Finally, attention should be given to the creditors' right to fol-
low the goods from the first bulk transferee into the hands of sub-
sequent bona fide purchasers for value without notice. The general
rule is said to be that the goods may not be claimed by the credi.
tors. 9 Texas cases seem to be to the contrary.9" A literal construc-
tion of the statute would compel the conclusion that neither the first
transferee nor any succeeding transferee gains title. This would
be an unfortunate result, especially where the goods are sold in
small lots to bona fide sub-purchasers. The general rule seems pre-
ferable in that creditors are encouraged to act promptly and the
86 Warren v. Parlin-Orendorff Implement Co., 207 S. W. 586 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918)
er. rej., earlier proceedings, 184 S. W. 640 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916).
87 See Dallas Coffin Co. v. Yeager, 19 S. W. 2d 156, 158 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929) er.
dism., later proceedings, 46 S. W. 2d 1016, 1018 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932), 69 S. W. 2d 493
(Tex. Civ. App. 1934) er. dism.
88 Cornish v. Nance Motor Co., 13 S. W. 2d 139, 140 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928) er. ref.;
Midland Shoe Co. v. A. L. & K. Dry Goods Co., 3 S. W. 2d 475, 478 (Tex. Civ. App.
1927) er. ref., earlier proceedings, 281 S. W. 344 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926) er. ref.; see
Mayfield Co. v. Harlan & Harlan, 184 S.W. 313, 315 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916).
8 9 VOLD, SALES (1931) 414; 3 WILLISTON, SALES (Rev. ed. 1948) §643d.
90 Midland Shoe Co. v. A. L. & K. Dry Goods Co., 281 S. W. 344, 348 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1926) er. ref., later proceedings, 3 S. W. 2d 475 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927) er. ref;
see Mayfield Co. v. Harlan & Harlan, 184 S. W. 313, 315 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916) ; Ter-
Tell Grain & Mercantile Co. v. Young, 152 S. W. 671, 672 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912).
A creditor who is paid by a purchaser, pursuant to agreement with the debtor-
seller, is not a transferee or purchaser subject to remedies under the Act. Monnig
Dry Goods Co. v. Copley, 30 F. 2d 95 (5th Cir. 1929).
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separation of title and possession is limited to one transfer trans-
action.
Uniform Commercial Code. Creditors protected under the Bulk
Transfers Article are those "holding claims based on transactions
or events occurring before the bulk transfer," and a Comment states
that unliquidated claims are included.91 A bulk transfer is "inef-
fective" if the Article is not complied with, but no provision is
made for remedial procedures. The Article contemplates that what-
ever procedures the local law affords for violation of bulk sales
legislation will continue. Since Texas procedures have proved
satisfactory, if the Bulk Transfers Article were enacted, it would
be well to indicate that the remedies available to creditors remain
the same. This might be done by adding the last sentence of the
first section of the Texas Act to Section 6-104 or 6-109.
Section 6-111 declares that no action shall be brought under the
Article more than six months after the date on which the transferee
took possession of the goods. If the transfer was concealed, the
action may be brought within six months after its discovery. Sound
argument may be made for a short statute of limitations on actions
based on bulk transfers.
Section 6-110 adopts the general view protecting a bona fide
purchaser for value from a transferee who has failed to comply
with the Article.
CONCLUSION
In a broad sense, the Bulk Transfer Article would not change
Texas law. The purpose of both the Article and the Texas Bulk
Sales Act is to protect creditors from bulk transfers which work
a preference or an outright fraud. In detailed rules and procedures
the Article would, obviously, effect changes in Texas law. The
Article is of somewhat broader scope than the Texas Act (e.g.,
manufacturers are covered; "materials, supplies, merchandise or
91 § 6-109(1).
92 See § 6-104, Comment.
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other inventory" are subject to the Article). A change would be
made in the requirement of notice to creditors before passing of
possession or before paying for the goods. Bona fide sub-purchasers
would obtain valid title, contrary to at least one Texas holding.
The question whether mortgages are covered would be settled, and
one must concede that such "transfers" are within the policy of
bulk sales legislation. Many new provisions appear in the Article.
Auctions would be dealt with, and a "bracketed" section would
impose on a transferee the duty of assuring that creditors are paid.
A time limitation on the bringing of suit would be declared.
The Article is by no means a final and complete answer to the
problem of bulk transfers. 3 But its sections are carefully worked
out and integrated, and the requirements and procedures are well
calculated to safeguard creditors. No excessive burden is placed
upon the transferor and transferee in view of the policy served by
the Article. Even the "bracketed" section appears desirable, since
no denial can be made that a man who sells his business ought
somehow to be constrained to pay his creditors. Under the Article
ample room still remains for the courts to interpret, to adjust the
equities of the parties and to apply estoppel, waiver and other
judicial doctrines. At the same time the principle of uniformity
among the states is promoted. This writer expresses the opinion
that the Bulk Transfers Article of the Uniform Commercial Code
is a substantial improvement over the present statute and is worthy
of enactment.
93 See critical analysis in Weintraub and Levin, Bulk Sales Law and Adequate Pro-
tection of Creditors, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 418 (1952).
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